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Paolo Di Martino and Michelangelo Vasta 
Reassessing the Italian “Economic Miracle”: Law, Firms’ Governance, 
and Management, 1950–1973  
 
 
 
 
This article revisits and reassess the evolution of the Italian capitalism during the 
so called “economic miracle” (1950–1973). Using original sources, it analyses 
how the average small private firm, representing the vast majority of Italian 
businesses at the time, struggled to fully develop, grow, and modernize. The paper 
identifies the main source of the problem in a set of inefficient (or poorly-
enforced) laws and regulations that allowed firms to remain competitive, and 
business owners to extract resources out of them, using a wide display of 
borderline strategies. 
This article also claims that accountants (commercialisti) had a key role in 
implementing these strategies. 
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In 1964, the novelist Lucio Mastronardi published Il meridionale di Vigevano, a story that 
featured an accountant, Racalmuto, as an imposing figure who walked in the main square of his 
town as a “Messiah.”1 The novel took place in Vigevano, in the north of Italy, which was home 
to at least nine hundred workshops and firms producing about one-third of the total output of the 
Italian shoe sector at the time—and thereby provided a representative example of the rapidly 
expanding consumer goods industries that absorbed the vast majority of Italian private 
businesses.2 The world that emerges from the novel is one made up of small firms operating with 
basic technologies in traditional sectors and competing in short-term, and sometimes 
unscrupulous, strategies without embracing a long-term plan for the firms’ growth and 
development. In such a world, accountants (commercialisti) played a powerful role acting as 
middleman. The resources that firms produced were often extracted and used by their owners for 
private use, rather than re-invested in the expansion and modernization of businesses. 
The aim of this article is to show that such a fictional picture had a strong basis in reality. 
Even during the “economic miracle”—when state-owned big business and some large private 
businesses embarked on a trajectory of growth—the average small and medium sized Italian 
private firm still suffered from the practices Mastronardi described. Thus, this article reassesses 
the nature of Italian capitalism, looking at the phase of its maximum success by developing an 
idea suggested separately by a few authors.3 We note that Italian laws and regulations offered 
opportunities and incentives for owners to promote their own interests instead of the interests of 
their business. We show how these problems were most visible in the key areas of governance 
and management. Specifically, informal types of business organizations and governance were 
adopted alongside formal ones with the aim of protecting insiders from legitimate claims by 
outside parties. At the same time, management was de facto left in the hands of business 
accountants (commercialisti) in return, again, for insider advantages.4 The consequence of such 
peculiarities was that Italian businesses tended to remain small and centered in traditional labor-
intensive industries, with little investment in human capital and technology.5  
For historians, analyzing these topics opens the door to complex methodological issues, 
particularly in terms of sources. By definition, we focus on forms of behavior that tend to happen 
behind closed doors and leave little formal trace. To tackle the problem, we use two original 
sources. One is the minutes of legal hearings held by the Italian supreme court (Corte di 
Cassazione) between 1950 and 1979; the other is the published acts of the annual meetings of the 
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Italian National Association of Accountants (Atti dei congressi nazionali dei dottori 
commercialisti) for the same period. 
Choosing to focus on the Corte di Cassazione is motivated by various factors. Being a 
national court, the court wrote opinions on cases taking place all over the country, which 
guarantees proper national coverage. It provided a sample of both civil and penal cases; although 
Italy is a civil-law country and judges’ decisions were not formally binding, the verdicts of the 
Corte di Cassazione carried considerable weight and tended to establish legal precedents. One of 
the key advantages of using the minutes of legal hearing, so far neglected by Italian historians, is 
that the information provided is to a large extent independent from the nature of the allegations. 
For instance, a bankruptcy case might reveal information about a firm’s true form of governance 
in contrast to its declared one, or legal disputes among partners could shed light on cases 
involving lack of tax compliancy. More generally, besides the mere content and outcome of the 
actual legal disputes, these cases illustrate general problems and limitations in the law and 
enforcement mechanisms.6 
To perform our analysis, we identified the Italian law journals publishing, altogether, the 
totality of legal cases discussed by the Corte di Cassazione. In each journal, we searched any 
heading under which we could expect to find reports of business-related legal hearings. This 
generated a list of approximately 4,800 legal cases of potential interest discussed between 1950 
and 1979.7 Looking at the previous part of the process—court of appeal (Corte di appello)—for 
each case, we have an indication of the geographical distribution of the firms involved in the 
procedures. The sample is well-distributed among all Italian regions and fairly representative of 
the relative weight of different areas in the economic activities of the country. For instance, 
northern regions account for 45 percent of the total sample, central regions for 21.8 percent, and 
southern regions for 34.2 percent.8 These journals publish brief summaries (massime)—usually 
one page in length—of the minutes of legal hearings (sentenze). These 4,800 massime contain 
important information, particularly about firms’ governance, and therefore constitute a key part 
of our primary sources. In cases for which richer details are available, we also analyze the actual 
sentenze.9 
 Our second source is the official proceedings of the annual congresses held by the 
National Association of Accountants. We analyzed all volumes published between 1946 and 
1979, and we identified various articles written by eminent members of the association whose 
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content is pivotal in reconstructing the role of accountants within the Italian economy.10 To a 
large extent, these articles were lobbying devices aimed at protecting the interests of the 
association and its members from the perceived intrusion of other professional categories into 
what was considered a set of activities that was already too limited. From this perspective, 
accountants had no incentive to emphasize the actual extent of their involvement in the 
management of firms (something that was technically outside their official range of competence) 
and certainly nothing to gain by letting surface any trace of possible alliances with business 
owners at the expense of other parties. In this sense, the source is biased against our argument.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Italian economy 
and business structure during the golden age. Section 3 details the informal types of governance 
used by Italian firms and analyzes the aims of these strategies. Section 4 studies the profound 
influence of business accountants in the management of Italian firms.  
 
Italian Capitalism during Europe’s “Golden Age” 
 
The expression “golden age” is often used in the literature but rarely properly defined. It 
typically refers to the period of rapid economic growth that occurred between 1950 and 1973 in 
Europe and, more generally, in the Western world.11 In Italy it was a period of outstanding 
economic success—so much so that it has been labeled the “economic miracle” (or miracolo 
economico in Italian)—with rates of growth consistently higher than the Western European 
average.12 Indeed, the annual average rate of growth of Italy’s gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita during the period 1950–1973 was 5.0 percent versus the 3.8 percent average of the twelve 
Western European countries. Italy’s rate of growth was faster in the first subperiod (up to 1963), 
and it slowed slightly from 1964 to1973, being at 5.8 percent (compared to 3.7 percent in the 
twelve Western European countries) and 3.9 percent (compared to 3.8 percent), respectively.13 
At a macroeconomic level, a combination of sound policies and favorable exogenous 
conditions, both domestic and international, accounts for this excellent performance.  At the 
1951 census, a large share of Italy’s population was still employed in agriculture (44 percent); 
consequently, there was ample opportunity to move unskilled workers to more productive sectors 
while keeping salaries low. This potential advantage, however, became reality when it was 
decided to follow a policy of integrating into the growing international trade instead of an 
4 
 
import-substitution policy. Indeed, the share of Italian exports in world trade almost doubled 
between 1950 and 1973, while its composition moved rapidly from primary to industrial 
products. 14  Italian comparative advantages were amplified by a combination of restrictive 
monetary policy (which contained inflation and maintained international competitiveness) and 
expansionary fiscal policy, characterized by massive investment in infrastructure and physical 
capital. All of this took place in the context of American financial and technical support via the 
Marshall Plan, the low cost of energy (vital in a country without coal and oil), and the relatively 
low exchange rate of the lira when Italy joined the Bretton Woods system.15 
At the microeconomic level, there is no doubt that the golden age was a successful period 
for Italian businesses’ growth, capacity to innovate—at least in less technologically intensive 
sectors—and expansion into international markets. The degree of success, however, varied 
substantially across the Italian productive system (small firms/big business; private/state-owned; 
traditional/high-tech sectors). As Jon Cohen and Giovanni Federico argue, “put simply, some 
firms were efficient, dynamic, technologically up to date and internationally competitive, while 
others were inefficient, lethargic, backward, and uncompetitive.”16 
Certainly, one of the main actors in the success of the Italian productive sector was state-
owned big business. Firms belonging to national holdings such as the Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) were at the forefront of 
innovation in heavy sectors such as mechanics, metalworking, and chemicals. Between 1955 and 
1962, the core of the Italian golden age, their level of fixed investment was more than double 
that of private firms, with the result that they “could provide Italian industry at prices in line with 
international ones, with basic products in the sectors in which the large private firms . . . operated 
inefficiently.”17 State-owned businesses also led the tendency of Italian industry to converge 
toward the most advanced countries in terms of firm size. Although, as we will show later, the 
Italian manufacturing system still suffered, overall, from the issue of too a small average firm 
dimension, the rise of state-owned big business alleviated this problem.18 Private big business 
played an important role as well, although it was limited to specific industries, namely, car 
manufacturing (FIAT), electronics (Olivetti), durable consumer goods, and the light mechanical 
sector (Candy, Ignis, and Zanussi). In these industries, Italy established an important 
international presence and firms showed considerable innovative ability. 
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This picture, however, can be highly deceptive. In fact, while Italian big business reached 
the apex of its influence in the early 1970s, the size of the average firms remained comparatively 
small.19 This anomaly is well-known and supported by data: in 1961 Italy, the share of workers 
employed in manufacturing firms with less than ten workers was 28 percent, and that percentage 
decreased to 23.5 percent a decade later while in the early 1960s, this percentage was 6.4 percent 
in France, 2.5 percent in the United States, less than 3 percent in Germany, and 16.4 percent in 
Japan.20 Tiny firm size went hand in hand, as shown by Alessandro Nuvolari and Michelangelo 
Vasta,21 with a comparatively lower ability to innovate, and specialization in traditional sectors 
within Italian manufacturing was “handicapped by productivity gap, structural weakness, a 
reduced presence in technologically advanced sectors.”22 Indeed, the innovative strategy of the 
Italian economy was mainly based on imitative behavior and concentrated in mature sectors 
because innovative activity in science-based sectors, those close to the technological frontier, 
was significantly weaker. According to Matteo Gomellini and Mario Pianta, the Italian 
economy’s ability to consolidate dynamic mechanisms of innovative activities had vanished by 
1963 due to ineffective industrial and technological policies.23 Thus, even during its golden age, 
Italian capitalism suffered from structural problems. What is much less clear is where they 
originated. Considering the success of public big business and some private ones, the rest of the 
productive system appears to be the source of these anomalies: the average private firm, small to 
medium, that represented approximately 95 percent of the total number of concerns.  
At first glance, the model of small size/low innovation in traditional sectors firms could 
be seen as a rational choice in a world where rapidly expanding trade made the combination of 
cheap unskilled labor and imitative technologies profitable. However, scholars studying this 
period conclude, instead, that these were suboptimal strategies and the result of an inefficient 
institutional setup. Beyond such generic agreement, two distinct views appear in the literature. 
The majority and more established opinion emphasizes the absence of enough competition in 
Italian capitalism at the time, arguing that the “the problem . . . was too much protection, the 
solution more competition.”24 This problem has been identified in two areas: overregulation of 
the economic environment, particularly the labor market; and the lack of pro-market institutions. 
For instance, it has been argued that the absence of antitrust regulations and the structure of the 
credit sector limited the degree of competition, giving large Italian private firms monopolistic 
power with few incentives to further develop. Only a few actors were allowed to provide 
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industrial lending, paving the way for the credit institution Mediobanca to achieve a pivotal 
position and to orchestrate an inward-looking competition-adverse system of mutual control 
among big business. 25 Moreover, in the stock market, the features of voting rights and the 
widespread presence of pyramidal structures gave insiders the power to extract “private benefits 
of control,” which was unmatched in Europe. This limited the appeal of industrial investment and 
frustrated the development of the stock market to an extent that was anomalous among the most 
industrialized Western economies.26 
Other scholars offered an alternative view, stressing how the real issue in the Italian 
economy at the time was not only the lack of competition but mainly the inefficient nature and 
the poor enforcement of basic regulations and laws. According to Fabrizio Barca, the post-1945 
period was characterized by the inability to reform the state and its apparatus; consequently firms 
were left to their own devices without institutional support, such as sound industrial policy and 
clear procedures to address fiscal obligations. To counterbalance the impact of this problem, 
however, the state turned a blind eye to the advantages that firms received by not complying with 
the basic “rules of the game” and widely engaging with practices such as tax evasion and poor 
bookkeeping. 27 According to Paul Ginsborg, what Barca defines as a “compromise without 
reform” was not the result of unlucky contingencies; to the contrary, the inability to reform the 
state was a proper policy implemented to defend vexed interests, including those of specific 
economic categories (small shopkeepers, artisans, etc.). 28  Michele Salvati provides a 
complementary perspective, stressing how in the early 1960s, in a phase of relative slowing of a 
still fast-growing economy, opportunities were missed to make Italian capitalism more 
competitive by modernizing the economy, up-skilling the workforce, and establishing a credible 
ruling class committed to long-term objectives.29  
These ideas present an alternative view of the peculiarity of Italian capitalism: issues 
such as firms average small size or lack of innovation, rather than in the lack of competition, 
may be rooted in the inefficient rules of the game, which provided distorting incentives to 
business owners. In particular, these rules might have created practices allowing insiders to 
exploit firms in a way that was profitable for them but not for the firms. To fully appreciate how 
this was unique to Italy, contrast the situation with Germany’s and how its institutions were able, 
together with other elements, to balance the interests of insiders with those of firms.30 
Barca’s and Salvati’s interpretation however, has not been applied at the microeconomic 
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level—that is, its actual implications for firms’ structure and behavior—likely because of a lack 
of adequate primary sources. In the next sections, we develop and expand their interpretation of 
Italian capitalism’s anomalies during the golden age by showing how inefficient institutions 
affected the core areas of governance and management of  typical small- to medium-sized Italian 
private firms. 
 
The Hidden Side of Firm Governance  
 
This section focuses on the first structural anomaly of Italian capitalism of that time: 
namely, the pervasive use of a variety of informal styles of business organizations and 
governance often hidden behind the façade of standard ones. For instance, while firms formally 
appeared as sole-ownerships, partnerships, or incorporated businesses, their actual governance 
and ownership structure was much more complex. 31  A gap between the reality of firm 
governance and its description was certainly not unique to Italy.32 What was unique, however, 
was the strategic use of forms of governance not to maximize firms’ efficiency but to promote 
insiders’ self-interest at the expense of outsiders’ legitimate claims. To maximize insiders’ 
interests, businesses used different approaches, and they can be summarized in three main types 
of informal governance: hidden owner/manager, deceptive forms of governance/business 
organization, and firm-to-firm control. See Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
“Hidden ownership,” the first type of informal governance, is probably the most 
widespread. In this type, one or more partners did not formally appear as part of a given 
partnership, often despite their clear involvement in managing the business. This strategy would 
take different forms. The most straightforward one involved partners who were never explicitly 
identified or formally recognized, socio occulto in Italian or silent partner in English. Similar 
strategies consisted of a partner appearing officially only during prosperous times or only in a 
role (for example, as a limited-liability partner) that would protect the person from full legal 
responsibilities.33 The presence of a silent partner or partners in an established firm was a narrow 
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aspect of the more general problem of various people operating together without making 
business partnerships official.  
As shown in Table 1, this strategy took three different forms: concerns operating on the 
basis of an informal agreement among partners (de facto partnership or società di fatto); 
businesses with written contracts among partners but that were not registered (società 
irregolare); and firms with an official and written agreement among partners which was 
intentionally kept secret (hidden partnership or società occulta). Hidden or de facto partnerships 
(and/or the existence of silent partners) were legal, and some indirect evidence suggests that it 
was a common way of operating businesses. Although, by definition, it is impossible to know the 
number of these firms, the vast body of secondary literature exploring this phenomenon clearly 
indicates its relevance: the study of forms of governance such as “de facto partnerships” or 
“silent partners,” was common in commercial law journals and in the title of dedicated books, 
even as early as the 1890s and the 1920s.34 In general, the goal of these governance forms was to 
establish a degree of reputation without exposing business owners to the full weight of legal and 
financial liability (to achieve reputation without liability). Largely because of the inability of the 
Italian legal system to guarantee quick and efficient recovery of credit, trust and reputation 
tended to be endorsed on the full commitment of individuals rather than on the financial capacity 
of firms.35 The implication is that the use of the limited liability form (either partnerships or 
incorporated businesses) was not a straightforward means to create a distance between personal 
assets and those of the firm. Moreover, limited-liability had a higher cost than partnership 
because of the minimum amount of capital required and the impact of registration fees.36 Thus, 
for small partnerships or sole ownerships, it would have been too expensive to adopt the limited 
liability form, let alone the joint-stock version. In such a scenario, entrepreneurs with a high 
personal reputation could choose to use it by operating a business in such a way as to create the 
impression of being partners but without formally appearing in the firm’s hierarchy and without 
exposing their personal assets as collateral for financial obligations. Often this strategy implied 
agreements among partners to make only one of them legally responsible and officially 
endorsing all personal assets on the others, de facto limiting the degree of the firm’s liability to 
its own assets. These types of agreements were very common in family-run businesses in which 
only one member officially appeared in charge of the firm and was liable for losses, while the 
actual management of the firm was shared with other members of the family.37  
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From this perspective, the case of Mongello v. fallimento Mongello et al. is particularly 
illuminating. In the early 1960s, Mr. Mongello, together with his wife and daughter, traded in 
Rome in the shoe industry. His involvement was explicit, but when the business went bankrupt, 
Mongello tried to hide his financial responsibility by pretending never to have been a partner. In 
declaring Mongello guilty, the judge in charge commented that he “did not underwrite any 
commercial bill in order not to involve his assets . . . but behaved in such a way as to ingenerate 
the impression among third parties that he was a partner in the firm.”38 In a country characterized 
by a disproportionate share of family-owned firms, the fact that these strategies fit perfectly with 
this form of ownership structure suggests that their diffusion might be even more common than 
our evidence leads us to believe. Further, it is consistent with the idea of amoral familism 
allegedly dominating the Italian economic and cultural scene at the time (especially in the south) 
and leading to a lack of trust and suspicion of anybody outside the family boundaries.39 The 
effectiveness of these strategies is best exemplified by looking at the inconsistency in court 
decisions in similar situations. For instance, cases such as that of Mongello, where the 
involvement of the husband or wife in a business was proved, stand at odds with various 
occasions where judges were not able to prove such involvement. At the same time, looking at 
attempts by one half of a couple to hide assets in case of the bankruptcy of the other half, we find 
a wide variety of outcomes in court decisions. 40 This high level of inconsistency made the 
recourse to legal action not only slow and expensive but also open to an ample degree of 
uncertainty, reducing the incentives for potential victims to sue in court. 
“Deceptive forms of governance,” the second general type, consisted of hiding the true 
system of governance. This type could take different forms, such as ordinary industrial firms 
hidden behind the label of artisan ones, medium-sized businesses officially registered as small 
businesses, or unlimited-liability partnerships hidden behind joint-stock limited-liability ones 
whose shares (and managerial responsibilities) were concentrated in the hands of very few 
people or even a single person (the so-called tyrannical entrepreneurship, or imprenditore 
tiranno). 
The aim of this type of informal governance (to benefit from institutional protection) was 
to try to take advantage of privileged forms of business organization. Specifically, by choosing a 
given form of governance, business owners tried to avoid taxation, to be protected from 
bankruptcy, or to benefit, without the right to do so, from limited liability. For example, by 
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registering a concern as a small or artisan firm, business owners were, by law, discharged from 
bankruptcy and, in the latter case, also enjoyed a favorable tax status.41 In theory, to use either 
form of governance, a business had to meet certain criteria. In practice, however, technical 
difficulties made the enforcement of these norms very hard.42 For example, the legal status of 
artisan firms was based on a fuzzy definition of their activity, and it was up to judges to decide in 
each case whether a given firm qualified as artisanal. Various cases in the sample show the 
difficulties of such an evaluation and the enormous latitude left to judges.43  
The extent of abusing the artisan firm label is exemplified by some outstanding cases of 
standard industrial concerns trying to hide their nature. In the early 1960s, for example, in the 
town of Reggio Calabria, Antonio De Cusatis ran a baking factory disguised as an artisan firm. 
The industrial nature of this concern was evident from the simple fact that it was an important 
supplier of the Genoa-based firm Saiwa, at the time one of the leading Italian companies in the 
food processing sector. It also appeared—as the judge stressed—that De Cusatis’s business used 
“a complex pool of assets” such as buildings, machinery, and industrial plants.44  
Another example of the use of a falsified form of business organization was to register 
what was de facto a sole ownership, hence with unlimited liability, as a joint-stock limited-
liability business. In order to prevent abuses, the Italian civil code established that unlimited 
liability still applied in cases in which, despite the joint-stock form of business organization, an 
single owner could still clearly be identified. Various examples, however, demonstrate how 
easily this norm could have been circumvented by simply formally endorsing any amount of 
shares (even 1 per cent) to other people.45 The case that best shows the effectiveness of this 
strategy is Fallimento Melandri v. Banco di Napoli e Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia, 
involving the Genoa-based limited-liability company I.m.p.e.a. In this case, the judges quickly 
realized that what appeared formally to be a company was, in fact, a sole ownership, with Mr. 
Melandri owning 80 percent of the firm’s shares and being the company’s general manager. 
Despite this very clear situation, the court still decided not to charge Melandri with full financial 
liability.46  
“Firm-to-firm control,” the third general type of informal governance, took the form of 
businesses without any real role apart from being functional to the interests of another concern. 
This general strategy could be implemented in a variety of ways. For example, an existing 
limited-liability business could be used as a “proxy company” (impresa schermo) to cover the 
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activity of a partnership, or a firm could be explicitly used to endorse liabilities belonging to 
other firms. The objective of this type of informal governance (to generate, artificially, financial 
resources or to transfer them from business to business) was to increase the resources of a firm 
and/or to transfer them from one company to another to conceal them from creditors. A good 
example is the case of the bankruptcy of the limited-liability company S.a.m.i.c., a firm operating 
in the early 1960s in Milan mainly in the textile sector but with some interests in the construction 
industry as well. This concern was, at first glance, a solid and relatively large firm with a share 
capital of two billion lire in 1961. At the moment of its insolvency, when facing more than three 
billion lire of liabilities, however, it appeared that the amount of assets actually available to 
creditors was much lower. According to the judges, the reason for this discrepancy was that 
despite its status as a limited-liability joint-stock company, the firm was managed by a single 
person, Mr. Tavazzini, “as its own thing,” something that included the constant transfer of 
resources to a galaxy of other firms somehow controlled by S.a.m.i.c. itself. The success of this 
mechanism is shown by the fact that the character of this behavior could escape judges’ 
attention. Indeed, judges in the court of appeal had originally dismissed the case and only the 
judges in the Corte di Cassazione recognized that this network structure had the intent of hiding 
resources from creditors.47 
The systematic use of borderline, if not openly fraudulent practices, over many years naturally 
raises the question of why the victims of such behaviour did not react. The explanation is that, 
overall, firms could be either perpetrator or the victim depending on the specific circumstances, 
and hence no coordinated effort to change the rules was possible or convenient. Italian small and 
medium firms often operated in networks where mechanisms based on reputation and, in some 
cases, formal institutions and enforcement mediated the inherently very conflicting or, at least, 
extremely risky relationships between businesses, 48 even when this happened among members 
of the same family. 49 In within networks, shared information reduced the effectiveness of hidden 
or disguised forms of governance, strategies that were, by definition, based on the asymmetric 
distribution of information between the parties involved. More in general, opportunistic firms 
were subject to “a system of social actions inflicted by the community on trespassers”, 50 
potentially leading to be banned from the network. 51 
 Italian firms thus had different behaviors toward “insiders” and “outsiders,” where, with the 
exception of the state (an outsider by definition), what separated outsiders from insiders in 
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respect to a given firm was membership in the same network. 52 Interestingly, it was likely that 
sharing formal and/or informal rules within the network made fraudulent behavior more likely to 
occur outside of it. As it has been argued, rules and norms that increased trust among firms 
belonging to a given network led to “a similar reduction in the degree of trust of its members 
toward people/firms outside the district” 53   or, symmetrically, the common knowledge of 
fraudulent behaviour outside the network reinforced its internal cohesion, making trust among 
local firms appear to be the “by-product of conspiracy.” 54    
 
Firms’ Management and the Role of Business Accountants (Commercialisti) 
 
Together with the issues described above, the second anomaly in the structure of Italian 
capitalism during this period was the unique role played by accountants who were, in many 
cases, the actual managers of small- and medium-sized firms. In Italy, there were two 
professional categories formally recognized as accountants: the ragionieri commercialisti, those 
who had a specialized technical high school degree; and the more highly qualified dottori 
commercialisti, a professional title that required a university degree in economics, commerce, or 
business administration, and passing an exam administered by the National Association of 
Accountants. Accountants of both types in Italy had an importance that was unheard-of in other 
countries, the result of a unique legal and institutional setting. The main activity of this 
professional figure, common to the equivalent professions in Europe, was tax consultancy.55 In 
Italy, however, the peculiar complexity of fiscal norms made the position of accountants more 
central than anywhere else.56 The legislative reforms of the 1950s and then of the 1970s led to 
what was defined as an “amazing legislative confusion” to “reduce to very few specialists the 
number of people able to understand the whole fiscal system.”57 As a result, firms were simply 
impossible to operate without a specialist.58 As opposed to what happened in other economies, 
the structural involvement of accountants thus became a feature of every Italian small- and 
medium-sized firm. In such a situation, both supply- and demand-side factors made it convenient 
for these specialists to expand their roles. On the demand side, the relatively high fixed cost to 
hire accountants pushed the average small Italian concern to extract economies of scope by using 
them for the provision of other expertise, from labor management to financial consulting.59 On 
the supply side, this was a welcome opportunity as the lack of exclusivity to their functions made 
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accountants constantly seek to expand their roles. This was a perennial complaint among dottori 
commercialisti, who feared a race to the bottom from ragionieri commercialisti, while both types 
also faced competition from other professions, such as lawyers, and institutions, such as business 
associations and trade unions.60 Tax consultancy, therefore, was the first step in acquiring more 
extensive roles in firms; ragionieri commercialisti tended to become de facto managers of 
smaller firms, while dottori commercialisti tended to act as global consultants in relatively bigger 
ones.61 
The broad role played by accountants in Italian firms had deep implications for business 
management; accountants were hired personally by owners, not by their businesses, thus their 
focus was the direct satisfaction of their clients’ objectives, not necessarily the firms’ growth, 
innovativeness, and the like. In fact, in all instances in which owners’ (often short-term) goals 
conflicted with firms’ (often long-term) objectives, accountants/managers prioritized the former. 
This led commercialisti to concentrate, in their role as managers, on circumventing specific rules 
and regulations with the aim of protecting business owners from outsiders. This happened in 
three different areas: i) tax compliance; ii) undue transfer of firms’ resources to owners 
(“tunneling”); and iii) insolvency. 62  Of the three areas, tax evasion was by far the most 
widespread. In all three cases, these strategies went against firms’ interests: fiscal evasion 
artificially increased profits, creating incentives for saving on productive investment; resource 
tunneling naturally deprived businesses of the opportunity to grow; and the way insolvency was 
handled often led to the premature failure of possibly still-viable firms. 
In all three cases, outsiders were usually the state and the workers. The former, by 
definition, was the straightforward victim of any successful attempt at tax evasion. The latter 
were indirectly affected by any forms of tunneling, as reducing the firms’ resources would have 
made their working conditions harder and/or employment less secure. Workers, however, were 
also victims of the strategy of dealing with insolvency outside of formal bankruptcy law and 
practices through informal extrajudicial solutions. This is because workers were strongly 
protected under bankruptcy law—as their claims were considered equivalent to secured 
obligations and with very high seniority—but such protection did not apply to informal 
procedures. 
The first area, lack of tax compliance, is a long-term structural feature of the Italian 
economy and its degree was (and still is) simply not experienced in advanced Western 
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economies. For example, evidence by Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste shows that since 
1990, the level of the shadow economy (the transactions which evade government taxes and 
regulations), in Italy has been among the highest in the Western world, much higher than the G7 
reference group and in line with countries such as Spain or Greece. 63  Although a shadow 
economy does not directly mean fiscal evasion, it is a good proxy for the high level of economic 
activity that escapes formal controls and is hence more exposed to these types of problems. Data 
on tax evasion, although limited to the national dimension, confirm this perception. Even before 
World War II, estimates of fiscal evasion provided by the statistician Corrado Gini and by the 
editors of later editions of his book, ranged from approximately 32 percent in 1909 to 50–70 
percent in the 1920s and 1930s.64 After the war, the degree of tax evasion remained at similar 
levels to the point that during parliamentary discussion the Minister of Finance Ezio Vanoni 
argued: “We often have the feeling that tax evasion is a lifestyle choice.”65 Although these 
remarks applied to both firms and private citizens, it is clear from contemporary reports that 
small- and medium-sized businesses were at the forefront of fiscal noncompliance.66 Studies of 
firms operating during the 1950s and 1960s provide examples of tax evasion by small- and 
medium-sized businesses and suggest that “illegal accounting practices . . . [were] . . . very 
widespread at that time.”67 
 The fact that accountants were in charge of tax-related matters because of their 
monopoly over knowledge of the system logically implies that such an enormous degree of fiscal 
evasion would have been simply impossible without their help. 68 In fact, this view was so 
common as to be officially reported in speeches at the annual meetings of the Italian National 
Association of Accountants. In 1976, for example, Goffredo Sala quoted the newspaper Il 
Giorno, which identified commercialisti as those able to help firms “save on taxes.”69 Although 
the aim of the speech was to deny such a fact, paradoxically strong elements supporting this 
thesis came from other high-ranking members of that very association. An inquiry published in 
1964, for example, reported the opinion of one of the main Italian experts who accused the 
profession of inhabiting the “smelly cul-de-sacs of compliance towards tax evasion.”70 Even 
stronger support for this idea comes from a speech by Aldo Parea at the annual meeting in 1958: 
“It is uncontroversial that, for fiscal reasons, in every firm there are two book-keepings: the 
official one and the real one . . . the aim of keeping two book-keepings is to reduce the burden of 
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taxation.” 71  The widespread character of tax evasion and accountants’ knowledge of these 
strategies could hardly have been more explicit. 
The second area of alliance between accountants and business owners was resource 
tunneling. Evidence of the existence of this phenomenon can be found in the literature: Salvati, 
for example, argues that from the 1960s Italian entrepreneurs started exporting capital abroad 
(the so-called “strike of capital”) officially because of the fear of political tension and instability, 
but in fact probably in an attempt to save on taxes.72 Along similar lines, Marcello de Cecco 
argues that since the 1970s firms’ owners, concerned about social and political tensions, “began 
to extract capital from their companies.”73 Despite this information, it is difficult to precisely 
quantify tunneling among unincorporated firms and in historical perspective, and its actual extent 
remains a matter of debate. However, there is a specific form of tunneling that provides a sense 
of the extent of this problem among unincorporated firms. This regards assets (cars, real estate, 
etc.) formally endorsed to firms but leased to business owners or their families for personal use. 
The relevance and extent of this phenomenon can be indirectly inferred from the fact that in 2011 
the tax board made it compulsory to formally report these goods “to contrast the leasing of firms’ 
goods to partners or members of their families to circumvent fiscal obligations.”74 In fact, leasing 
of firms’ goods allowed business owners to achieve two results: on the one hand, they saved on 
the purchase of personal durable goods; and on the other, they reduced business taxes by taking 
into account the costs of artificial investments, thereby reducing the book value of profits.  
At least three elements suggest that accountants were in the position and had strong 
incentives to favor this sort of practice. First, as for fiscal evasion, commercialisti were in charge 
of bookkeeping, thus tunneling would have been impossible without their approval or at least 
their support. The details of Rossi e De Mattia v. Tribunale di Treviso, for example, clearly show 
how the firm’s owners depended completely on the accountant’s expertise to commit fraud by 
falsifying the books. It was the accountant, in fact, who first conceived and then managed the 
plan.75 Second, as mentioned above, accountants served individual customers, specifically the 
firms’ owners, rather than the firms.76 In such a situation, supporting the tunneling of resources 
from firms to owners would strengthen the commercialisti’s role. Third, tunneling also helped 
keep firms small and this, in turn, was pivotal in preserving accountants’ unique position of 
power in the Italian business world. As a matter of fact, dottori commercialisti served small 
firms, while ragionieri commercialisti served even smaller businesses organized as artisan firms. 
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It is no coincidence that the number of accountants in general increased in the 1970s and, in 
particular, the 1980s in conjunction with the rise of the relative share of small- and medium-sized 
firms, which followed the oil shocks and crisis of big business. 77  
The link between firms’ small size and the power and influence of accountants has both 
supply- and demand-side explanations. On the demand side, large firms did not use external 
consultants but instead internalized this role. This led to constant complaints among accountants 
who viewed big businesses, in particular state-owned ones, as the “enemy.”78 On the supply side, 
contrary to what happened in other countries, Italian accountants viewed themselves as 
craftsmen specializing in all possible functions and very often operating individually or, at most, 
in association with a few colleagues. 79  Even in 1983, approximately 70 percent of dottori 
commercialisti (that is, those dealing with relatively bigger firms) operated independently.80 This 
issue was probably cultural, but there were certainly strong incentives provided by the 
institutional set-up as well. For example, unlike in any other European country, the Italian law at 
the time forbade accountants’ firms to incorporate in joint-stock companies. 81  Without this 
possibility, the market for services to big businesses remained out of reach for individual 
accountants, who were unable or unwilling to specialize in a narrower set of roles In fact, at least 
since the 1960s, accountants were perennially concerned about the competition of foreign firms 
in this segment of the market.82  
The third area, a structural alliance between accountants and firms’ owners, appears in 
the management of cases of business insolvency. Similar to fiscal compliancy (or lack thereof), 
the issue of bankruptcy in Italy shows peculiarities unparalleled anywhere else in Europe. 
Specifically, the vast majority of cases were dealt with using informal rather than legal 
procedures.83 This aspect was, prima facie, against the interests of accountants because they 
operated as receivers in formal cases of bankruptcy, while in other countries, such as France and 
Belgium, this role was handled by lawyers. 84  Despite this, the National Association of 
Accountants often explicitly supported the use of informal procedures. In a paper presented at 
the annual conference of the National Association in 1958, no less than the president of the 
association, Luigi Antonelli, wrote in praise of the so-called cessio bonorum—an extrajudicial 
agreement between creditors and debtors in cases of illiquidity or insolvency—arguing for the 
superiority of private solutions given the length, costs, and implications of formal procedures.85 
17 
 
Although presented as an opportunity for firms to economize on costs, support for using cessio 
bonorum might hide a different set of advantages for some of the parties involved. 
First, the remuneration for managing informal procedures, which in Italy was one of the 
main activities of accountants in a sort of monopoly, was decided on a commercial basis and 
could be much higher than the fee obtained by accountants in the role of official receivers in 
bankruptcy procedures. In fact, accountants often publicly complained about the fact that a 
number of cases of official bankruptcy resulted in small payments.  
Second, the very nature of cessio bonorum offered the possibility of satisfying majority 
creditors at the expense of minority ones, hence protecting insiders from legitimate claims from 
outsiders. In fact, cessio bonorum implied that major, nonguaranteed creditors, those who were 
part of the deal, obtained full control of a firm’s assets and could use them to recover their credit 
either via liquidation or by keeping the firm running. Minority creditors agreed to drop any claim 
on future dividends in return for an immediate payment of a share of their credits in line with the 
expected market value of the firm’s assets or of its potential ability to generate profits in the 
future. This solution was clearly open to abuse from majority creditors. For example, a key and 
tricky issue was the calculation of the percentage of payment due to minority creditors, 
especially in cases when the firm was kept alive. Accountants seemed fully aware of these issues 
and of the key role played by the person in charge of the procedure. As Aldo Parea stated in a 
speech at the annual meeting of the National Association in 1960, “It is obvious that such a 
procedure may lead to an unequal treatment among creditors, hence it is necessary for the 
professional in charge . . . to follow, in performing this role, the soundest principles at the basis 
of any profession.” 86  While arguing along these almost moralistic lines, however, he also 
claimed that informal deals would avoid the “numerous controls and various cautions” typical of 
official bankruptcy procedures.87 It is worth noting that a loophole in Italian bankruptcy law 
made relatively easy to favor some creditors at the expense of others. According to the law, a 
disparity of treatment among creditors led to preferential bankruptcy (bancarotta 
preferenziale)—which was sanctioned only by a fine—and not to fraudulent bankruptcy 
(bancarotta fraudolenta), a much more serious crime. However, charging someone with 
preferential bankruptcy was not necessarily proportional to the actual damage done to the firm or 
minority creditors. To illustrate this inconsistency, we compare two cases. The first is the 
cooperative firm La Padana, operating in Parma in the early 1970s. In this case, while the 
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cooperative was already declared bankrupt, the general manager used almost the totality of the 
business’s assets (about fifty million lire) to pay specific debts, including his remuneration for 
previous years of employment (about five million lire). Despite the evident damage to minority 
creditors and the use for personal interest of a conspicuous part of the firm’s assets, the apparent 
felon was charged only with preferential bankruptcy.88 This example stands at odds with what 
happened in the case of the Lavoratori del Mare di Carrara, a fishing cooperative active in the 
town of Carrara in the late 1950s. In this case, the mere distribution of assets as a charitable act 
without evidence of fraud was considered a case of fraudulent bankruptcy, and the two managers 
involved were sentenced to four years in jail.89 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper, based on the use of two overlooked sources, reveals how Italian capitalism 
suffered from widespread problems in the two key areas of business activity, governance and 
management, even during the post–World War II miracolo economico. The analysis of 
approximately 4,800 legal cases shows how small and medium Italian firms often camouflaged 
their true forms of governance and business organization to protect the interests of insiders with 
little, if any, consideration for the long-term growth and consolidation of firms. A number of 
idiosyncratic legal loopholes created distorted incentives for entrepreneurs to use and abuse 
forms of governance such as artisan firms, small businesses, and de facto partnerships. 
Furthermore, institutional deficiencies granted business accountants a uniquely broad role in 
firms’ management. Consequently, extensive use of opaque practices such as tax evasion, 
diversion of resources from firms to their owners, and the recourse to informal liquidation 
bankruptcy procedures instead of formal ones, emerges from a detailed analysis of the official 
proceedings of the annual congress of the National Association of Accountants. For some Italian 
entrepreneurs, it was easier to maximize revenues via these practices than by investment in 
human capital, technologies, or new organizational forms. 
This article refers to the period of maximum success of the Italian economy. In an age of 
growing demand for labor-intensive goods and relatively low international competition, the 
phenomena analyzed in the article did not stop Italian firms from being profitable. However, we 
believe that the inefficient institutional set-up established in this historical period established a 
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pattern of suboptimal development that later revealed its limitations. Few, if any, of the issues 
already visible in the “golden age” have been addressed in the following decades, and Italian 
business still suffers from structural problems of a lack of compliancy with basic “rules of the 
game.” Over the years, this contributed to keeping the average Italian firm small, limiting 
innovation, relying mainly on labor-intensive technologies, and confining it to traditional sectors. 
We believe this partially explains the very poor Italian economic performance of the last twenty-
twenty-five years.90  
Overall, this article points to profound deficiencies in key areas of the institutional set up 
of business activity. In this scenario, as widely noted, the question that naturally emerges is “why 
has Italy been so stubbornly resistant to deep institutional changes?”91 Although a complete 
answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article, some basic explanations can be 
recalled. Following the emergence of various streams of economic literature focusing on the 
central role of institutions in determining national performance, Italian scholars turned their 
attention to this topic and agreed on the existence of a pool of factors that hindered institutional 
change. On the one hand, it has been stressed that Italy suffered from a number of structural 
constraints both economic (limited competition, including the huge role of family business and 
large pyramidal groups, which hindered the development of talent) and political (weaknesses of 
parties, lack of leadership, and rigidity of the constitutional design).92 In a similar vein, the 
general weakness of the ruling class has been identified as another main constraint.93 Other 
authors also emphasize how the interests of small firms mattered to the main political parties 
much more than the ones of big business, which were conceived as potential political 
competitors.94 More generally, it has also been argued that beyond the power of specific lobbies, 
institutional deficiencies serve the interests of a widespread minority able to successfully defend 
the status quo.95  
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